A surprising connection on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a recruiter, probably a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political reports for a firm from China peppered with “non-public” or privileged insights. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash favored.
It may seem clear, on this telling, that something about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency still considers it valuable to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated Chinese agents were contacting Britons on the platform on an extraordinary level, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, seeking governmental, industrial, military and scientific secrets. But a new campaign aimed at politicians and Westminster has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
A spying warning was issued on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Changes
In the curious style of British intelligence, there was no official release of the protective guidance from the agency or the interior ministry. Yet the agency was aware its briefing note would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press helps the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive purpose.
This warning has the effect of uncovering additional details from within Westminster, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency wants public figures to understand that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Additionally, the internal security service understood to have been responding to any specific incident in parliament, though the recent actions does come after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed previous legislation resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity face substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a crime if somebody engages in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize intelligence collection techniques and the size of its spy network is enormous, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop contacts over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the government situation may mean someone rapidly marginal turning significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the west at a level under the point of direct conflict. The nation has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions internet devices.
Chinese authorities is involved in relentless efforts to find covert sources on UK politics online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.
